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INTRODUCTION
Hospital peer review committees' have been used to review staff physi-
cian quality since the early 1900's. 2 Confidentiality of the resulting minutes
and memoranda has become widely recognized as a necessary corollary
to the effectiveness of these committees. Consequently, the proceedings3
of peer review committees have generally been held to be non-
discoverable to plaintiffs in malpractice actions.
Since 1975, Ohio and forty-seven other states have passed legislation
carving out a new privilege, confidentiality of review committee pro-
ceedings. 4 These non-discovery laws aid in the maintenance or improve-
ment of quality health care through efficient, periodic review of hospital
I Peer review committees monitor and evaluate the quality of patient care in a given
hospital.
These committees must be distinguished from Professional Standards Review
Organizations (PSRO). A PSRO is an independent organization accredited by Medicare
to inspect potential member hospitals. PSRO's are primarily concerned with efficient
overall hospital operations and are generally of no concern to malpractice plaintiffs.
See generally Public Citizens Health Research Group v. Department of Health, Educ.,
and Welfare, 449 F. Supp. 937 (D.D.C. 1978) (history of PSRO legislation, summary
of provisions, and applicability of Freedom of Information Act).
2 Ostrow, The Historical Precedents for Quality Assurance in Health Care, 37 AM.
J. OCCUPATIONAL THERAPY 23 (1983).
3 The term "proceedings" may be misleading since peer review committees often
meet informally. Nonetheless, the term will be used throughout this article because of
its common association with peer review.
4 ALA. CODE § 22-21-8 (1984); ALASKA STAT. § 18.23.030 (1976); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 36-445.01 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-934 (1979); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1157
(West 1986); COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-43.5-102 (1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-19A
(West 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1768 (1981); D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-505 (1981);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.40 (West 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-133 (1985); HAWAII REV.
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services. 5 Confidentiality promotes candid self-evaluation by members
of the medical profession. However, the majority of the states, including
Ohio, deny access to peer review records and reports even where public
policy unquestionably favors granting a plaintiff's discovery request. In
such a case, only exposure will lead to an equitable result.
Where an injured patient sues a hospital for negligently permitting an
incompetent physician to remain on its medical staff, peer review records
and reports should be released. In Wesley Medical Center v. Clark, 6 the
plaintiffs in the underlying medical malpractice action alleged that the
hospital administrators negligently allowed the defendant physician to
operate on their infant son, although they were aware, or should have
been aware, of the physician's incompetence. 7 The Kansas Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's determination that (1) the hospital, as an ac-
credited and licensed medical facility, has a duty to "monitor and
evaluate" its entire medical staff; and (2) the peer review committee
records regarding the defendant doctor were discoverable. The court
reasoned: "[W]e decline to adopt an absolute statement of public policy
declaring all such records to be protected in toto .... Under the facts
presented, the public interest will best be served by allowing these plain-
tiffs access to the materials sought ... .
Discovery of the committee reports revealed that the hospital's peer
review committee had held hearings and had found that the doctor had
performed unnecessary operations, yet the committee had failed to take
Stat. § 624-25.5 (Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-1392a, b, & e (1973); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 110, § 8-2101 (1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.6-2 (1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 135.40
(West 1963); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4915 (1985); Ky. REV. STAT. § 311.377 (1980); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3715.3 (West 1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2505, 2510
(1985); MD. HEALTH OCC. CODE ANN. § 14-601 (1984); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 331.532
(1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.64 (West 1975); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-63-9 (1984);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-16-203 (1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-2048 (1981); NEV. REv. STAT.
§ 49.265 (1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 329:29 (Supp. 1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:84A-22.8 (West 1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-9-5 (1986); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6527
(McKinney 1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-95 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-01-02.1
(1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.251 (Baldwin 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
§ 1-1709 (West Supp. 1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 41.675 (1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
§ 425.4 (Purdon Supp. 1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-25 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. §
40-71-10 & 20 (Law. Co-op. 1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 36-4-26.1 (1986); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 63-6-219 (1982); TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. § 4447d (Vernon 1976);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-25-3 (1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1443 (Supp. 1986); VA.
CODE § 8.01-581.17 (1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.250 (West Supp. 1986); W.
VA. CODE § 30-3C-3 (1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.38 (West 1986); Wyo. STAT. § 35-2-602
(1977).
1 See Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970).
6 234 Kan. 13, 669 P.2d 209 (1983).
7 Id. at 15, 669 P.2d at 212. See JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS
(JCAH), ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS (1982) [hereinafter JCAH MANUAL].
I Wesley, 234 Kan. at 26, 669 P.2d at 219.
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action. Shortly thereafter, the parents in Wesley obtained a substantial
settlement from the hospital. 9 In reaction to Wesley, the Kansas legislature
enacted a peer review confidentiality statute that does not permit such
discovery. 1°
The purpose of this article is to illustrate the inherent problems of
blanket peer review confidentiality and to suggest a more equitable ap-
proach. Part I traces the development of reviewing hospital quality and
explains the operation and justifications of peer review committees. In
Part II, the arguments supporting confidentiality are compared with the
public policy favoring proper disposition of corporate negligence cases
in order to determine and recommend the correct level of confidentiali-
ty. In Part III, the peer review discovery statute in section 2305.251 of
the Ohio Revised Code is critically evaluated for its practical value to
the advancement of hospital health care. The article concludes that a
liberalization and redefinition of the Ohio statute has been long over-
due and therefore, provides a model statute.
This article will not address the discoverability of other hospital
records," such as those protected by the physician-patient privilege 2
or hospital incident reports. 13 The potential for liability of review com-
mittee participants 14 will not be covered in detail.
I. QUALITY CONTROL THROUGH PEER REVIEW
In 1910, the Flexner Report 5 exposed details of inadequate hospital
conditions and called attention to the need for quality assurance. The
I Telephone interview with Richard Cordry, the attorney for plaintiff-respondent,
who is with the law firm of Michaud, Cordry, Michaud, Hutton, & Hutton, in Wichita,
Kansas (Feb. 22, 1985). The parents sued the doctor for negligence.
10 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4915 (1985).
11 See generally Calloway, Understanding Hospital Records, 30 PRAC. LAw., Jan.
15, 1984, at 11; Cramer, Discovery of Medical and Hospital Records, 58 FLA. B.J. 148
(1984).
12 See generally OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (Baldwin 1985); Gellman, Prescrib-
ing Privacy: The Uncertain Role of the Physician in the Protection of Patient Privacy,
62 N.C.L. REV. 255 (1984).
13 See generally Spencer, The Hospital Incident Report: Asset or Liability?, 22 AIR
FORCE L. REV. 148 (1980); Comment, Hospital Accident Reports: Admissibility and
Privilege, 79 DICK. L. REV. 493 (1975).
14 In most states, committee members, witnesses, and other review participants are
immune from civil liability. See, e.g., OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.25 (Baldwin 1985).
See generally Comment, Reallocating Liability to Medical Staff Review Committee
Members: A Response to the Hospital Corporate Liability Doctrine, 10 AM. J.L. & MED.
115 (1984); Note, The Legal Liability for Medical Peer Group Participants for Revoca-
tion of Hospital Staff Privileges, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 692 (1978).
"1 A. FLEXNER, Medical Education in the United States and Canada: A Report to
the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching (1910). Although the American
Medical Association, which had been founded in 1847, had set up minimum professional
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Third Clinical Congress of Surgeons in North America took the first step
toward voluntary accreditation in 1912. This organization adopted a
resolution that introduced the necessity for standardization among
hospitals. 16 In the same year E. A. Codman, a Massachusetts professor
of surgery, developed an early system of review which successfully reveal-
ed various sources of deficient health care within his own hospital. 17 In
1918, the American College of Surgeons (ACS)18 initiated the first na-
tionwide system of voluntary accreditation. The ACS established a
minimum standard for hospitals seeking accreditation.19 In a one page
report entitled Minimum Standard, the ACS required "[tihat the staff
review and analyze at regular intervals their clinical experience in the
various departments of the hospital. 20
The Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) was
established in 195121 in order to continue the work of the ACS. 22 In 1953,
the JCAH published the Standards for Hospital Accreditations, 23 which
was an expansion of the ACS Minimum Standard. Although accredita-
tion is a voluntary process, the JCAH has become a widely accepted stan-
dard of quality assurance in American hospitals.2 4
standards and some states had medical licensure regulations, Flexner believed that health
care remained inadequate. See Gosfield, Medical Peer Review Protection in the Health
Care Industry, 52 TEMPLE L.Q. 552 (1979).
16 L. DAVIS, FELLOWSHIP OF SURGEONS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF
SURGEONS 476 (1960); Affeldt & Walczak, The Role of JCAH in Assuring Quality Care,
in HOSPITAL QUALITY AssURANCE 49 (1984). The resolution recognized that such a system
would provide patients with a mechanism with which they could recognize better facilities
and would provide physicians with an incentive to improve the overall quality of health
care services.
11 Codman reassessed the health status of patients at least one year following
hospitalization and compared that result with the actual treatment rendered. The cases
with inconsistent or unsuccessful results were studied for causal connections. Codman,
The Product of a Hospital, 18 SURGERY, GYNECOLOGY, AND OBSTETRICS 491 (1914).
18 A more complete history of the ACS is provided in Gosfield, supra note 15, at
554-55.
1" See Shanahan, The Quality Assurance Standard of the JCAH: A Rational Ap-
proach to Patient Care Evaluation, in ORGANIZATION AND CHANGE IN HEALTH CARE QUALI-
TY ASSURANCE 21, 23 (1983).
20 Id. (quoting the 1918 ACS Minimum Standard report).
21 The JCAH was composed of members of the American College of Surgeons, the
American Hospital Association, the American Medical Association, the American Col-
lege of Physicians, and the Canadian Medical Association. Maxwell, Hardie, Rendall,
Day, Lawrence, & Walton, Seeking Quality, THE LANCET, Jan. 1, 1983, at 45-48.
22 JCAH, ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HosPITALS, Introduction at VII (1978);
Gosfield, supra note 15, at 555 n.36.
23 JCAH, STANDARDS FOR HOSPITAL ACCREDITATION (1953).
24 By 1965, 84 % of the hospital beds in the United States were in hospitals accredited
by the JCAH. C. EISELE, THE MEDICAL STAFF IN THE MODERN HOSPITAL (1967); Dunn
& Holbrook, Medical Malpractice Litigation: The Discoverability and Use of Hospitals'
Quality Assurance, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 54, 58 (1976).
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There are two sources from which quality review committees may arise.
First, the JCAH requires that accredited institutions establish mechanisms
to review qualifications and performance of their medical staffs. 25 Se-
cond, in some jurisdictions the law has imposed a duty on hospital gover-
ning bodies to maintain a system of continuing review. 26 It is notewor-
thy that state courts and legislatures have merely affirmed the position
of the JCAH that a hospital must establish quality review committees
in order to fulfill the duty of its governing body to protect the public
from incompetent physicians.2" Hospitals have responded by establishing
some form of quality review.
Peer review committees seek to monitor and evaluate the quality of
patient care. This is accomplished by reviewing patient records that in-
One major reason for the acceptance of the JCAH standards is that the federal govern-
ment grants all hospitals accredited by JCAH a presumption of compliance with the
Medicare-Medicaid Conditions of Participation. 42 U.S.C. § 1395(bb)(a)(1) (1976). The
Conditions of Participation under 42 C.F.R. § 405.1020 are binding upon hospitals seeking
government reimbursement. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(e)(9). In 1983, the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services published proposed new Conditions of Participation [48
Fed. Reg. 299 (Jan. 4, 1983) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. Parts 405, 480, and 482 through
488)] in order to simplify, combine, and relax the old Conditions of Participation. ASPEN
SYSTEMS CORP. HEALTH LAW CENTER, HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL, ADMINISTRATOR'S VOLUME
1A, 10 (1959, updated 1984) [hereinafter ASPEN SYSTEMS].
Second, other state and federal programs may recommend or even require JCAH
accreditation. Id. at 11 n.24 and accompanying text. Further, the prestige associated
with accreditation has been a motivating force for hospitals to comply with the JCAH. Id.
25 The JCAH duty to review is set forth in JCAH, ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR
HOSPITALS (1985), Medical Staff Standards, Standard VI (effective for survey purposes
July 1, 1984, and for accreditation purposes, Jan. 1, 1985); ASPEN SYSTEMS, supra note
24, at 11. The Aspen Systems Manual states: "As a part of the hospital's quality assurance
program, the medical staff strives to assure the provision of high-quality patient care
through the monitoring and evaluation of the quality and appropriateness of patient
care." JCAH accreditation is based on conformity with these standards, and non-
compliance could result in the loss of accredited status.
Also, the Conditions of Participation explicitly require such review. 42 C.F.R. §
405.1020. See also ASPEN SYSTEMS, supra note 24, at 10.
26 Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 I1. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d
253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966); See Ludlam, The Impact of the Darling
Decision upon the Practice of Medicine and Hospitals, 11 FORUM 756 (1976).
27 For a complete discussion of the duty of hospitals to maintain a competent medical
staff, see infra notes 60-88 and accompanying text.
Medical Staff Standard I of the JCAH, supra note 25, requires that:
There is a single organized medical staff that has overall responsibility for the
quality of the professional services provided by individuals with clinical
privileges, as well as the responsibility of accounting therefore to the govern-
ing body. There is a mechanism to assure that all individuals with clinical
privileges provide services within the scope of individual clinical privileges
granted.
See also JCAH, HOSPITAL ACCREDITATION REFERENCES 13 (1964), stating: "The gover-
ning body must assume the legal and moral responsibility for the conduct of the hospital
as an institution. It is responsible to the patient, the community, and the sponsoring
organization."
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dicate serious or unexpected complicationsz8 and by reviewing random-
ly selected medical records .' The committee may simply choose one of
these review methods, depending upon the scope of the individual com-
mittee.30 Generally, a case will not be reviewed unless the patient has
developed complications during hospitalization. 31 Peer review commit-
tees are composed exclusively of the hospital's staff physicians. 32
Peer review proceedings are likely to contain evidence material to a
malpractice claim. The JCAH encourages several types of quality review 33
that may be desired by an injured patient, 34 but most states have enacted
legislation making the minutes and memoranda of these committees im-
mune from discovery. 35 Understandably, peer review committee par-
ticipants would be reluctant to testify candidly when confronted with
the possibility of malpractice claims against the physician whose prac-
28 For example, tissue committees which essentially are surgical peer review com-
mittees, review surgical records in which the pre-operative and post-operative diagnosis
evidence a major discrepancy. Butler, Hospital Peer Review Committees: Privileges of
Confidentiality and Immunity, 23 S. TEX. L.J. 45, 48 (1982); Dunn & Holbrook, supra
note 24, at 61-62.
Medical audit committees examine records of patients that die under peculiar cir-
cumstances, e.g., within twenty-four hours after admission or as a result of cerebral
hemorrhage. Dunn & Holbrook, supra note 24, at 60-61. These records are analyzed
to discover whether the physician acted in a professionally competent manner. Id.
29 See Fifer, Integrating Quality Assurance Mechanisms, in ORGANIZATION AND
CHANGE IN HEALTH CARE QUALITY AsSURANCE 217, 221 (1983).
30 The scope of each hospital review committee is defined in the bylaws of that
hospital. The JCAH requires these bylaws. See JCAH MANUAL, supra note 7, at 106.
31 Bower, Discovery of Peer Committee Review Reports in Medical Malpractice,
1983 TRIAL LAW. Q., at 55, 57.
32 Physicians are in the best position to organize and maintain peer review commit-
tees. ASPEN SYSTEMS, supra note 24; Fifer, supra note 29, at 220; Hetherington, Quality
Assurance and Organization Effectiveness in Hospitals, in ORGANIZATION AND CHANGE
IN HEALTH CARE QUALITY ASSURANCE 75 (1983). Consequently, staff physicians are
minimally controlled. In fact, they are given a great deal of power and independence.
ASPEN SYSTEMS, supra note 24; Hetherington, supra note 32 at 76.
33JCAH encourages hospitals to maintain the following quality review committees:
tissue review, pharmacy and therapy review, medical record review, review of the clinical
use of antibiotics, and review of "other patient-related professional activities." JCAH,
supra note 30, at 106-08.
34 For example, credentials committees are quality review committees which often
may be of interest to malpractice plaintiffs. Butler, supra note 28, at 48. In corporate
negligence cases, see infra notes 60-68, the information compiled by a credentials com-
mittee may be quite helpful.
11 See supra note 4. Also, legislatures in a number of states have enacted statutes
that limit the liability of those engaged in medical review activities. These statutes are
designed to assure peer review participants that they are protected from suits brought
by disgruntled physicians alleging libel, defamation, and interference with professional
relationships. See supra note 14.
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tice is the subject of review.16 Shields from peer review discovery
effectively side-step such confrontations, but in so doing, the commit-
tees function as a form of unchecked self-review.37 As such, committee
physicians tend to explain away behavior of their peers.31 Therefore,
plaintiffs suing hospitals for negligent review often espouse weighty public
policy arguments in favor of discovery.
II. CONFIDENTIALITY AND THE HOSPITAL'S DUTY
State statutes that prevent discovery of peer review committee pro-
ceedings are, for the most part, a product of the medical malpractice
crisis.3 9 The American Hospital Association and other medical societies
that are represented by the JCAH continue to provide influential sup-
port for such statutory discovery bars. 40 These statutes create a qualified 4l
legal privilege of confidentiality. Although most jurisdictions have already
enacted some form of this legislation, further developments regarding
the scope of the privilege in each state are inevitable. 42
The public policy supporting confidentiality of peer review commit-
tee proceedings was stated in Bredice v. Doctors Hospital, Inc.43 There,
the District of Columbia district court denied the plaintiff's motion for
the production of minutes and reports of any Board or Committee of
the hospital or its staff concerning the death of a patient. The Bredice
6 This argument was judicially accepted in Bredice, 50 F.R.D. at 250.
37 Some authorities contend that physicians are in the best position to review the
staff. Hetherington, supra note 32, at 75.
18 See infra notes 33 and 68 and accompanying text.
19 For a discussion of the "medical malpractice crisis" of the 1970's, see Aitken,
Medical Malpractice: The Alleged "Crisis" in Perspective, 1976 INS. L.J. 90 (1976); Berger,
The Medical Malpractice Crisis: How One State Reacted, 11 FORUM 64 (1975); Sheehan,
Medical Malpractice Crisis in Insurance: How It Happened and Some Proposed Solu-
tions, 11 FORUM 80 (1975).
In most jurisdictions, statutes protecting peer review proceedings from discovery
were passed during this time period. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.251 (Baldwin
1985).
40 Confidentiality is critical to an effective quality assurance program. AHA POLICY
AND STATEMENT, QUALITY ASSURANCE IN HEALTH CARE INSTITUTIONS (1978) (Available
at the American Hospital Ass'n, Chicago, Ill.).
41 In most jurisdictions, there are statutory exceptions to the peer review committee
discovery protection. Also, courts vary in their interpretations of the statutes. See infra
notes 52-58.
42 See Springer, The Conflicting Legal Pressures on the Modern Hospital, 14 N.C.
CENT. L.J. 82, 92 (1983). The body of law creating statutory peer review protective statutes
"is still in its infancy and is undeveloped and often unpredictable." Id. According to
Springer, the discoverability controversy will endure because "the pressure for disclosure
will continue and even mount." Id. at 94.
43 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970).
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court held that (1) the plaintiff had not shown "good cause- 44 for the
discovery of committee records45 and (2) that the plaintiff's motion was
against public policy. The court expounded:
Confidentiality is essential to effective functioning of these staff
meetings; and these staff meetings are essential to the continued
improvement in the care and treatment of patients. Candid and
conscientious evaluation of clinical practices is a sine qua non
of adequate hospital care. To subject these discussions and
deliberations to the discovery process, without a showing of ex-
ceptional necessity, would result in terminating such delibera-
tions. Constructive professional criticism cannot occur in an at-
mosphere of apprehension that one doctor's suggestion will be
used as a denunciation of a colleague's conduct in a malpractice
suit .46
A few courts have specifically rejected the Bredice rationale in favor
of more liberal discovery rules4 7 and/or the desire to provide the judicial
system with the best evidence.48 In response to decisions declaring peer
review proceeding minutes or memoranda subject to discovery, many
state legislatures have drafted statutes protecting peer review records.49
The language of peer review protection legislation varies from state
to state.50 The intent of the legislature is frequently unclear. 5 State courts
44 Id. at 251.
41 The court stated:
There is an overwhelming public interest in having those staff meetings held
on a confidential basis so that the flow of ideas and advice can continue
unimpeded. Absent evidence of extraordinary circumstances, there is no good
cause shown requiring disclosure of the minutes of these meetings .... These
committee meetings, being retrospective with the purpose of self-improvement,
are entitled to a qualified privilege on the basis of this overwhelming public
interest.
Id.
46 Id. at 250.
47 See, e.g., Kenney v. Superior Court, 255 Cal. App. 2d 106, 63 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1967)
(information sought should be disclosed if it will assist the plaintiff's preparation for trial).
" See, e.g., Nazareth Literary and Benevolent Institution v. Stephenson, 503 S.W.2d
177 (Ky. 1973) (finding public policy favors disclosure as long as the information sought
is relevant to the subject matter of the action).
4' See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4915 (1985), which was adopted after the court's
decision in Wesley Medical Center v. Clark, 234 Kan. 13, 669 P.2d 209 (1983).
50 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 329:29 (Supp. 1985) provides a broad privilege. See in-
fra note 56 and accompanying text.
On the other hand, some peer review protection statutes have an extremely limited
scope. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-22.8 (West 1979) only exempts "utilization review com-
mittees." Hence, the privilege has been narrowly construed so that discovery of several
types of peer review committees, including tissue committees, has been permitted. Young
v. King, 136 N.J. Super. 127, 344 A.2d 792 (1975).
11 For example, no legislative history is available for OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.251
(Baldwin 1985).
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interpreting peer review shield statutes have found several exceptions
to the general rule of non-discovery.s" Some state legislation expressly
provides for such exceptions.5 3 Generally, the exceptions focus on either
the character of the material sought-4 or the status of the proponent of
the material sought in the discovery. 5 - Some statutes simply forbid the
discovery of all quality review committee reports. For example, New
Hampshire's non-discovery legislation states:
All proceedings, records, findings and deliberations of medical
review committees ... are confidential and privileged and shall
not be used or available for use or subject to process in any other
proceeding. The manner in which a medical review committee
and each member thereof deliberates, decides or votes on any
matter submitted to it is likewise confidential and privileged and
shall not be the subject of inquiry in any other proceeding.56
State legislatures rarely include clauses that permit discovery upon a
showing of exceptional need.57 The inequity of omitting this type of
provision 8 is apparent in the area of corporate negligence.- 9 Under this
52 See, e.g., Kalish v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 270 N.W.2d 783 (Minn. 1978).
53 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.265 (1981).
,4 See, e.g., Tucson Medical Center, Inc. v. Misevch, 113 Ariz. 34, 545 P.2d 958
(1976).
1s See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.265 (1981).
56 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 329:29 (Supp. 1985).
11 However, a few jurisdictions do provide such a clause. For example, the Nebraska
statute states:
The proceedings, minutes, records, and reports of any medical staff commit-
tee ... together with all communications originating in such committees are
privileged communications which may not be disclosed or obtained by legal
discovery proceedings unless . .. a court of record, after a hearing and for
good cause arising from extraordinary circumstances being shown, orders the
disclosure....
NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-2408 (1981) (emphasis added).
For other examples refer to D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-505 (1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 32, § 3296 (1978); VA. CODE § 8.01-581.17 (1984).
18 Sissella Bok notes that "[slecrecy preserves liberty, yet this very liberty allows
the invasion of that of others." S. BoK, SECRTs 28 (1983). Confidentiality has thus "become
a means for covering up a multitude of questionable and often dangerous practices."
Id. at 133.
Most peer review shield laws are not drafted in keeping with traditional legal stan-
dards for creating a privilege. See Dunn & Holbrook, supra note 24, at 66. According
to Professor Wigmore, four conditions are necessary to justify the creation of a privilege:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be
disclosed;
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation between the parties;
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought
to be sedulously fostered;
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the com-
munications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct
disposal of litigation.
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theory, a hospital may be held liable for negligently retaining an incompe-
tent physician on the hospital medical staff.
The doctrine of corporate negligence is a relatively new development .60
Its growth can be attributed to the increasingly active role that hospitals
play in monitoring and controlling the quality level of patient medical
care. The duty to review physician treatment arises from the common
law,61 JCAH, 62 hospital bylaws, 63 and state statutes. 64 Prior to this cause
of action, plaintiffs who brought malpractice suits could only successfully
sue hospitals under the doctrine of respondeat superior or the theory
of negligent hiring of a physician. In many jurisdictions, injured patients
were totally barred from recovery against hospitals by charitable or
governmental immunity statutes. The ability to sue hospitals provides
plaintiffs with several advantages, 65 the most important of which is ac-
cess to the hospital's "deep pocket."
Only if these four conditions are present should a privilege be recognized.
8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
Arguably, the application of peer review shield statutes does not comply with the
fourth condition. In the context of the physician-patient privilege, the majority opinion
in Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131
Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976) (holding psychiatrist liable for acts of insane patient), stated "the
privilege ends where the public peril begins." Id. at 441, 551 P.2d at 347, 131 Cal. Rptr.
at 27.
59 Corporate negligence is also referred to as "institutional liability." See Springer,
supra note 42, at 90.
60 Hollowell, Does Hospital Corporate Liability Extend to Medical Staff Supervi-
sion?, 32 DEFENSE L.J. 203, 204-05 (1983).
61 The courts of thirteen states have expressly recognized corporate negligence. Tuc-
son Medical Center, Inc. v. Misevch, 113 Ariz. 34, 545 P.2d 958 (1976); Purcell v.
Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (1972); Elam v. College Park Hosp., 132
Cal. App. 3d 332, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1982); Kitto v. Gilbert, 39 Colo. App. 374, 570
P.2d 544 (1977); Mitchell County Hosp. Auth. v. Joiner, 229 Ga. 140, 189 S.E.2d 412
(1972); Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 111. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d
253 (1965); Johnson v. St. Bernard Hosp., 79 Ill. App. 3d 709, 35 Ill. Dec. 364, 399 N.E.2d
198 (1979); Ferguson v. Gonyaw, 64 Mich. App. 685, 236 N.W.2d 543 (1975); Gridley
v. Johnson, 476 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. 1972); Bost v. Riley, 44 N.C. App. 638, 262 S.E.2d
391 (1980); Corleto v. Short Memorial Hosp., 138 N.J. Super. 302, 350 A.2d 534 (1975);
Hannola v. City of Lakewood, 68 Ohio App. 2d 61, 426 N.E.2d 1187 (1980); Johnson
V. Misericordia Community Hosp., 99 Wis. 2d 708, 301 N.W.2d 156 (1981).
62 Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 349 A.2d 245 (1975).
63 Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973 (1967).
64 Wesley Medical Center v. Clark, 234 Kan. 13, 669 P.2d 209 (1983).
65 By suing the hospital, an injured patient may avoid the necessity of expert
testimony by another physician as to the professional standard of care. Some states on-
ly subject hospitals to the standard of a reasonable man as opposed to the professional
standard used for doctors. As such, the plaintiff can avoid the so called "conspiracy
of silence." Second, jurors may not be as reluctant to find against a hospital as they
might be for a physician. Third, the statute of limitations may be longer for hospitals.
Annotation, Hospital's Liability for negligence in Failing to Review or Supervise Treat-
ment Given by Doctor, or to Require Consultation, 12 A.L.R. 4th 57, 63 (1982).
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Corporate negligence liability serves an exceptionally important public
need. According to one commentator, "[ten] percent of health care prac-
titioners are so marginal in their performance as to be (to use Nader's
catchy phrase) unsafe at any speed."66 Although state statutes providing
immunity from committee member liability and record discovery
stimulate candor, few hospitals successfully maintain truly efficient peer
review committees. 67 When physicians are faced with reviewing their
fellow professionals, the tendency is to explain away behavior. 68 As a
result, patients are seriously, and sometimes fatally injured by incompe-
tent physicians. Potential institutional liability will stimulate more ef-
fective physician self-review.
Generally, a hospital breaches its institutional duty if its peer review
committee (1) fails to review69 a physician who should have been review-
ed, or (2) fails to report inadequate treatment to the proper hospital
authorities.70 In short, the hospital is held accountable if its mechanisms
for review are negligent. Recently, a Wisconsin court reasoned:
The complex manner of operation of the modern day medical
institution clearly demonstrates that they furnish far more than
66 Fifer, supra note 29, at 220.
67 Dr. Springer notes:
It has been my experience in my practice to work with a good number of
dedicated medical staff leaders who were firm, fair and effective in enforcing
medical staff disciplinary procedures. However, most hospitals are often unable
to obtain or retain quality leadership over long periods of time. Presently there
is no system in any hospital which ensures the consistency of quality medical
staff leadership.
Springer, supra note 42, at 89.
618 See Hetherington, supra note 32, at 77 ("Too often.. . the members of organized
medical staffs see themselves as defenders of the medical profession."); Springer, supra
note 42, at 89. See also Fifer, supra note 29, at 221 stating:
[Mlany physicians decry the need to evaluate the quality of professional per-
formance, saying "we all know that 10 percent of the doctors in this hospital
(this society, this city, this state) could not take care of your cat, and, further,
we all know who they are ... " Lacking objective criteria or even some con-
sensus among various reviewers, the judgment of "goodness" hinges on "whether
I would have done it that way."
Other motivating factors to explaining away behavior include: the tendency to avoid
"red tape," Hetherington, supra note 32, at 74; and the fear of disgruntled physicians
retaliating against committee action by suing under theories of lack of procedural due
process, Springer, supra note 42, at 89-90; or discrimination, Annotation, Hospital's
Liability for Negligence in Selection or Appointment of Staff Physician or Surgeon, 37
A.L.R.3d 645 (1971).
69 State supreme courts which have dealt with the subject unanimously hold that
this duty to review does not include the duty to supervise actual physician treatment.
See generally Hollowell, supra note 60. However, one California lower court found a
hospital duty to supervise actual physician treatment. Gonzalez v. Nork and Mercy
Hospital, No. 228566 (Cal. Super., Nov. 19, 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 60 Cal. App.
3d 770, 131 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1976), aff'd and transferred, 20 Cal. 3d 437, 573 P.2d 458,
143 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1978).
70 Annotation, supra note 65, at 62.
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mere facilities for treatment. They appoint physicians and
surgeons to their medical staffs, as well as regularly employing
on a salary basis resident physicians and surgeons ... and they
charge patients for medical diagnosis, care, treatment and
therapy, receiving payment for such services through privately
financed medical insurance policies and government financed pro-
grams known as Medicare and Medicaid. Certainly, the person
who avails himself of our modem "hospital facilities". . . does
not anticipate that its ... doctors . will be acting solely on
their own responsibility. 71
The landmark corporate negligence case is Darling v. Charleston Com-
munity Memorial Hospital" In Darling, a physician seriously injured
a child's leg while removing a cast. The injury resulted in a later partial
amputation of the child's limb. The Darling court rejected the argument
that the hospital could not control physician care and was the first high
court to recognize the principle that the hospital governing body "is an
apex from which authority flows and to which responsibility returns." 7 1
The result of the decision was that hospitals were charged with the duty
to exercise reasonable care in the selection, review, and supervision of
their staffs. 74 The Darling decision stopped short of defining corporate
negligence in detail. Since the court found that the defendant physician
was a hospital employee, the opinion did not address the issue of whether
the hospital's liability was also dependent upon that employment status. 75
Second, the court failed to define the point at which a hospital's duty
ends.76 Therefore, although the impact of the decision was significant,
Darling has been given limited precedential weight. 77
Purcell v. Zimbelman 8 clarifies those areas of corporate negligence
left untouched in Darling. In Purcell, the plaintiff alleged that the defen-
dant physician negligently performed rectal surgery. There had been
several other suits filed against the same doctor with similar allegations.
The Purcell court held that (1) a finding of corporate negligence liability
is not dependent upon a hospital-physician employment relationship and
71 Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hosp., 99 Wis. 2d 708, 301 N.W.2d 156,
164 (1981).
72 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965).
73 ASPEN SYSTEMS, supra note 24.
74 Hollowell, supra note 60, at 204.
71 Comment, Patient Recovery A Poor Prognosis for Hospitals? The Expanding Scope
of Hospital Liability, 10 Omio N.U.L. REV. 519, 534 (1983).
76 Hollowell, supra note 60, at 204.
77 Illinois cases decided since Darling have limited the scope of corporate negligence.
See, e.g., Stogsdill v. Manor Convalescent Home, Inc., 35 Ill. App. 3d 634, 343 N.E.2d
589 (1976) (duty of hospital arises only where an employment relationship is found).
See infra note 82.
71 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (1972).
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that (2) a hospital has the "duty of supervising the competence" of staff
physicians,79 as opposed to the duty of supervising actual treatment by
those doctors. The Purcell limitations represent the purest form of cor-
porate negligence. 8° Although several state courts have adopted "pure
corporate negligence, "81 other jurisdictions recognize some variety of the
doctrine. 82
Standards published by the JCAH or medical staff bylaws promulgated
by the hospital may be used by malpractice plaintiffs to establish cor-
porate liability. The JCAH requires that accredited hospitals conform
to its standards and establish minimum hospital bylaws. 83 These stan-
dards and hospital bylaws have been used to establish the hospital's stan-
dard of care in selecting or retaining members of the medical staff. 84 Proof
of noncompliance with either the JCAH standards or the hospital's bylaws
may be damaging evidence of a breach of the hospital's standard of care."
State statutes and administrative agency regulations may be used to
establish corporate negligence liability. Some hospital licensure statutes
simply place the overall responsibility for hospital patient care upon the
hospital's governing body.8 6 Others expressly provide that the hospital's
governing entity is solely responsible for the actual selection and review
of staff physicians. 87 Regulations promulgated pursuant to state legisla-
tion often detail the hospital's duty to hire, limit, and review its medical
staff. 8 These state regulations have been used to define the hospital's
standard of care.
Peer review minutes and memoranda can be crucial to a finding of
institutional liability. In cases where a hospital's alleged misconduct in-
volves an omission the hospital will not be held liable unless it can be
estalished that the actions taken by it against a staff physician, whether
in the form of suspension, remonstration, restrictions, or other means,
were insufficient under the circumstances of the case. It is difficult for
a malpractice plaintiff to show that a defendant hospital has breached
79 Id. at 81, 500 P. 2d at 341.
80 Hollwell, supra note 60, at 210; Comment, supra note 75, at 537-38.
"I See, e.g., Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hosp., 99 Wis. 2d 708, 301 N.W.2d
156 (1981).
82 For example, the Illinois courts have reduced hospital corporate negligence to
no more than respondeat superior. Comment, supra note 75, at 538 n.123.
83 JCAH, MANUAL supra note 7, Medical Staff, Standard IV Interpretation at 106.
" Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 349 A.2d 245 (1975);
Pederson v. Dumouchel, "72 Wash. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973 (1967).
11 In addition, the loss of accreditation could occur.
86 See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 50.36 (West Supp. 1986).
17 See, e.g., MIcH. CoMP. LAWS § 33.21513 (1978).
" See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 10D-28.58, implementing FLA. STAT. § 395.11 (1947);
OKLA. HOSPITAL LICENSURE REGS., Part Two, A, 3, State Department of Health, Licen-
sure and Certification Div. (April 17, 1976); ASPEN SYSTEMS, supra note 24, Medical
Staff at 8-9.
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its duty to review physician staff privileges unless the plaintiff first ob-
tains records of that review. Most states do not provide a discovery ex-
ception for an injured patient who sues a hospital, even when he can
show an exceptional need for such discovery.89 The presence of an "ex-
traordinary necessity" exception would trigger in camera proceedings-
to decide whether the need for disclosure was justifiable. 91
When a discovery exception for a showing of extraordinary need is
absent from state peer review shield legislation, unfair legal results are
inevitable. For example, until recently, Arizona's peer review confiden-
tiality statute92 reserved trial court power to order hospital disclosure
of peer review committee records. It is clear that the drafters intended
to permit discovery of some peer review documents in some situations,
but the statutory description of protected committee records was unclear.
The statute read, in part: "the information considered by the (peer review)
committees is subject to subpeona but shall be delivered by the custo-
dian only to the judge in a judicial proceeding, who shall review such
information ... "93
This legislation was interpreted by the Supreme Court of Arizona in
the context of a corporate negligence action. In Tucson Medical Center,
Inc. v. Misevch, 94 plaintiff alleged that the defendant physician was in-
toxicated and falling asleep while he was operating on plaintiff's wife.
Subsequently, she suffered from brain damage and cardiac arrest, and
89 See supra note 42 and accompanying text. In the four jurisdictions (District of
Columbia, Maine, Nebraska, and Virginia) that do have such a clause, there is no reported
case law allowing discovery of peer review committee records. See supra note 57. Fur-
ther, none of the four jurisdictions recognize corporate negligence as a cause of action.
It is likely that a court would allow discovery if faced with a corporate negligence case
in a state with a statutory clause which allows discovery after a showing of exceptional
necessity. Wesley Medical Center v. Clark, 234 Kan. 13, 669 P.2d 209 (1983). See supra
note 11 and accompanying text.
90 In camera proceedings provide a trial judge with discretionary power to allow
portions of otherwise protected material to be discoverable.
91 The right to disclose a portion of otherwise privileged information has developed
over centuries. Catholic theologians allowed doctors to reveal only "so much of the secret
as (was) necessary to avert the harm, and only to the person threatened, who (had) a
right to this information, rather than to ... the curious or the gossip-hungry at large."
Box, supra note 58, at 130.
92 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-445.01 (1986). In 1982, the Arizona legislature amended
the statute to read:
All proceedings, records, and materials prepared in connection with ... peer
review... and the records of such reviews ... shall be confidential and shall
not be subject to discovery.... In any legal action brought against a hospital
licensed pursuant to this chapter claiming negligence for failure to adequately
do peer review, representatives of the hospital are permitted to testify as to
whether there was peer review as to the subject matter being litigated.
93 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-445.01 (1986).
94 113 Ariz. 34, 545 P.2d 958 (1976).
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later died. The Arizona court held that Tucson Medical Center and its
governing body could be held liable for injuries resulting from that physi-
cian's negligent administration of anesthesia. 95 The high court established
(1) a duty to supervise the competence of staff doctors and, (2) a duty
to act by limiting or terminating staff privileges 96 if the physician could
pose an unreasonable risk to patients.
Even though the Misevch court established corporate negligence in
Arizona, the supreme court's holding placed the plaintiff at a tremen-
dous disadvantage on remand. The court interpreted the state peer review
discovery statute to limit the scope of documents available to the plain-
tiff by distinguishing between factual findings of the committee and in-
formation considered by the committee. The court remanded the case
to the trial court with instructions that: "[T]he proper demarcation is
between purely factual, investigative matters and materials which are
the product of reflective deliberation .... Statements and information
considered by the committee are subject to subpeona for the determina-
tions of the trial judge, but the reports and minutes of the medical review
committees are not.."97
The Arizona statute provides for automatic in camera proceedings,
but the court's approach is unreliable. Evidence gathered by a peer review
committee and findings of that committee are equally important. A com-
mittee finding is just as likely to contain evidence of corporate negligence
liability as are facts presented to the peer review committee. The statute
erroneously implies that disclosure of committee findings is much more
injurious to effective and candid peer review than is discovery of com-
mittee evidence. As a result trial courts will concentrate exclusively upon
an input-output distinction in order to make a discovery decision. They
will favor defendants because the evidence of a hospital staff's duty to
report committee findings will be insufficient. The Misevch discovery
holding is a result of the vague wording and rationale behind the Arizona
statute.
In 1970, when Bredice v. Doctors Hospital, Inc. 98 espoused the public
policy rationale in favor of peer review committee record confidentiali-
ty, the opinion still carefully noted that in certain situations the public
95 Id. at 36, 545 P.2d at 960.
96 The court relied on Purcell v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (1972),
and concluded:
If the medical staff was negligent in the exercise of its duty of supervising its
members or in failing to recommend action by the hospital's governing body
prior to the case in issue, then the hospital would be negligent .... When the
hospital's alleged negligence is predicated on an ommission to act, the hospital
will not be held responsible unless it had reason to know that it should have
acted within its duty to the patient to see to it that only professionally compe-
tent persons were on its staff.
Tucson Med. Center, 113 Ariz. at 36, 545 P.2d at 960.
97 113 Ariz. 34, 545 P.2d at 961.
98 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970).
1986-87]
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
interest would best be served by allowing discovery. The Bredice court
held that peer review committee minutes and reports concerning a
malpractice plaintiff were not discoverable, but the information was en-
titled to a "qualified" privilege that could be overridden by a showing
of "exceptional necessity" or "extraordinary circumstances." 99 Clearly,
current state review confidentiality legislation has not been responsive
to the fundamental scope of the privilege as espoused in Bredice.
The language of a state peer review confidentiality statute should com-
pel a two step trial court process. First, it should mandate in camera pro-
ceedings upon a showing of just cause. To determine whether "just cause"
exists, a trial judge should consider the importance of the information
to the plaintiff's case as well as the difficulty that the proponent will en-
counter in acquiring equivalent information.100 Second, the statute should
guide in camera consideration so that an exception to non-discovery is
granted only where the value to the litigation outweighs the value of
confidentiality. 101 A discovery request should be granted when the need
for peer review information is so important that public policy favors
disclosure in light of the widely recognized importance of peer review
committee confidentiality. Except in corporate negligence cases, a
malpractice plaintiff will rarely be able to exhibit the requisite need to
justify disclosure. Therefore, information should be disclosed only after
a showing of "exceptional necessity."'' 2 A corporate negligence plain-
tiff's need would pass the "exceptional necessity" test when the defen-
dant physician has a recurrent history of professional negligence com-
plaints. As a result, peer review committee candor would only be sacrific-
ed in exceptional cases.
The trial judge should disclose only those records relating to whether
the peer review committee knew or should have known that the physi-
cian was (1) incompetent to practice medicine, or (2) unfit to operate,
diagnose or treat patients in the specific area that the plaintiff was in-
jured. Again, the need for discovery should be weighed against the need
for confidentiality before any information is revealed.
99 Id. at 250-51.
100 Professor Moore recommends these two considerations to aid in determining
whether "just cause" exists in the context of FED. R. Civ. P. 26(B)(3), which relates to
the discovery of attorney work product information. MILLIGAN, OHIO FORMS OF PRAC-
TICE & PLEADING at 26-74 (1984). Like an attorney's work product, the product of a peer
review committee is sensitive material that should not be freely disclosed.
101 See WIGMORE, supra note 58.
102 By using the phrase "exceptional necessity," only worthy proponents will have
access to peer review committee information. Here, a mere showing of "just cause" might
lead some courts to require little more than relevance for the production or discovery
of peer review information.
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III. PEER REVIEW DISCOVERY IN OHIO
In 1975, the Ohio legislature adopted Ohio Revised Code Section
2305.251 which is a typical peer review confidentiality statute which pro-
vides that
Proceedings and records of all peer review committees ... shall
be held in confidence and shall not be subject to discovery or
introduction in evidence in any civil action against a health care
professional or institution arising out of matters which are the
subject of evaluation and review by such committee. No person
within attendance at a meeting of such committee shall be per-
mitted or required to testify in any civil action as to any evidence
or other matters produced or presented during the proceedings
or such committee, or as to any finding, recommendation, evalua-
tion, opinion, or other action of such committee or member
thereof. Information, documents, or records otherwise available
from original sources are not to be construed as being unavailable
for discovery or for use in any civil action merely because they
were presented during proceedings of such committee nor should
any person testifying before such committee or who is any
member of such committee be prevented from testifying as to
matters within his knowledge, but the witness cannot be asked
about his testimony before such committee or opinion formed
by him as a result of any such committee hearing.103
Ohio courts have upheld the statute's constitutionality, 104 and have
held that even physicians may not discover peer review information. 10
In 1981, the Ohio Court of Appeals held that where a party opposes
the introduction of peer review evidence, "it is incumbent upon the trial
court to hold an in camera inspection of the information, documents,
or records in question and to question the witness as to the nature of
his testimony, "106 but discovery of all peer review information was pro-
hibited by the statute. Therefore, Ohio common law provides for in
camera proceedings, but the trial judge has little power to release any
peer review information.
Ohio's recognition of hospital corporate negligence stems from Ohio
common law, Ohio legislation, and accepted hospital standards. In Han-
nola v. City of Lakewood, 0 7 the plaintiff sued Lakewood Hospital alleging
103 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.251 (Baldwin 1985). Section 2305.251 applies to
the following committees: utilization review, tissue review, peer review, and commit-
tees reviewing professional qualifications, activities of its medical staff, and applicants
for admission.
104 See Gates v. Brewer, 2 Ohio App. 3d 347, 442 N.E.2d 72 (1981); Young v. Gersten,
56 Ohio Misc. 1 (1978).
10" See Atkins v. Walker, 65 Ohio App. 2d 136, 416 N.E.2d 651 (1979).
.06 Gates, 2 Ohio App. 3d at 351, 442 N.E.2d at 77.
107 68 Ohio App. 2d 61, 426 N.E.2d 1187 (1980).
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that her husband died as a result of the negligence of a staff physician
in the hospital's emergency room. The Ohio Court of Appeals cited tradi-
tional corporate negligence cases and recognized an independant hospital
duty to protect hospital patients from staff physicians' negligence.108
Ohio legislation and the JCAH may also be used to establish hospital
corporate negligence liability. The Ohio Revised Code requires every
hospital governing body to maintain standards that define staff physi-
cian competence. 10 9 This statute has been interpreted to establish a hospital
duty to adopt standards that measure professional staff skill and com-
petence. 10 Also, JCAH accredited Ohio hospitals must utilize peer review
committees to monitor and evaluate the quality of patient care provid-
ed by their staff physicians."' The JCAH requirements have become a
national standard for accredited hospitals. At least, the Ohio legislation
and the JCAH standards are useful to establish the hospital's duty of
care. 1 2 Proof of a breach by the hospital will result in hospital corporate
liability.
Although the Ohio peer review statutory shield has been interpreted
to trigger in camera proceedings,"13 the scope of the trial judge's power
of disclosure is limited. Ohio, like most states," 4 provides no exception
for discovery even when the circumstances are such that public policy
would favor discovery. Since Ohio courts have already defined the scope
of the statute, the state legislature has the sole authority to initiate such
an exception.
The most logical approach for the Ohio legislature to follow is to amend
section 2305.251. The legislative changes should be minimal so as to avoid
legislative overruling of Ohio precedent interpreting the old statute."5s
Ohio courts will continue to interpret the legislation, such as determin-
ing when an "extraordinary necessity" exists. The legislature should aid
Ohio courts by providing some legislative history. The phrase "absent
a showing of extraordinary necessity exhibited in a hearing held for good
cause" 1 6 should be inserted as follows:
Absent a showing of extraordinary necessity exhibited in a hearing
held for good cause, proceedings and records of all peer review
108 Id. at 69, 426 N.E.2d at 1192. The court stated: "A hospital clearly does have
a duty to prevent a physician's malpractice at least to the extent that it establishes pro-
cedures for the granting of staff privileges and for the review of those privileges." Id.
109 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3701.351 (Baldwin 1985).
110 See Dooley v. Barberton Citizens Hosp., 11 Ohio St. 3d 216, 465 N.E.2d 58 (1984).
"' See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
112 Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 349 A.2d 245 (1975).
113 See supra note 106.
114 Only four jurisdictions provide the exception. See supra note 57.
"1 See supra notes 104-05, 107 and accompany text.
116 For the reasoning behind this wording choice, see supra notes 100-02 and ac-
companying text.
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committees... shall be held in confidence and shall not be sub-
ject to discovery or introduction in evidence in any civil action
against a health care professional or institution arising out of mat-
ters which are the subject of evaluation and review by such com-
mittee. No person within attendance at a meeting of such com-
mittee shall be permitted or required to testify in any civil ac-
tion as to any evidence or other matters produced or presented
during the proceedings of such committee, or as to any finding
recommendation, evaluation, opinion, or other action of such
committee or member thereof absent a showing of extraordinary
necessity exhibited in a hearing held for good cause. Informa-
tion, documents, or records otherwise available from original
sources are not to be construed as being unavailable for discovery
or for use in any civil action merely because they were presented
during proceedings of such committee nor should any person testi-
fying before such committee or who is any member of such com-
mittee be prevented from testifying as to matters within his
knowledge, but the witness cannot be asked about his testimony
before such committee or opinion formed by him as a result of
any such committee hearing absent a showing of extraordinary
necessity exhibited in a hearing held for good cause. 117
Plaintiffs suing under a hospital corporate negligence theory are the
most likely discovery proponents to display a need so important that
public policy favors disclosure in light of the well recognized importance
of peer review committee confidentiality. Therefore, adoption of the sug-
gested discovery exception would promote Ohio hospital corporate
liability.
IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, the confidentiality of peer review committee minutes and
memoranda has been instrumental in the growth of peer review which
has, in turn, lead to improved hospital care. It is clear that there is a
strong public interest in promoting proper limitations on hospital staff
privileges for incompetent physicians. Where a hospital governing body
maintains strict review mechanisms for the granting, limiting, and ter-
minating of staff privileges, corporate negligence liability is unlikely.
The threat to hospitals of potential liability will result in improved
health care. Corporate negligence liability will generally occur where
hospital review and reporting is ineffective. In this respect, hospital cor-
porate negligence is an effective tool to curb malpractice. The financial
threat of the imposition of civil liability upon a hospital provides an in-
centive for hospitals to adopt policies ensuring tougher qualification and
117 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.251 (Baldwin 1985) (insertions emphasized).
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review standards. However, the privilege of confidentiality should not
hinder a plaintiff's cause of action for inadequate review. Most state peer
review committee shield laws can create evidentiary barriers to corporate
negligence liability. Although the need for peer review confidentiality
is well accepted, the public is better served by disclosure in cases where
extraordinary need for peer review information exists.
Howard S. Rabb
